The Global Sumud Flotilla as Embodiment of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

The Global Sumud Flo/lla as embodiment of the Responsibilty to Protect (R2P) by Dr Coralie PISON HINDAWI Strangely enough, the concept of Responsibility to Protect has been largely absent from the global debate about the genocide unfolding in Gaza and the extensively documented paEern of internaFonal crimes targeFng PalesFnians. The almost complete lack of reference to the concept two years into what is broadly considered to be the first live-streamed genocide is even more suprising as the Responsibility to Protect, which was officially adopted during the 2005 World Summit Outcome, celebrated its twenFeth anniversary in 2025. The inability of some R2P proponents to acknowledge the concept's applicability to the situaFon in PalesFne is nothing new. However, the scale and intensity of the violence targeFng PalesFnians for more than two years with close to no appropriate reacFon from most Western states raises very serious quesFons about R2P as a concept and as a global iniFaFve aiming for a beEer protecFon of populaFons from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleaning and crimes against humanity. ASer introducing briefly what the R2P concept adopted twenty years ago is about, this paper will insist on its obvious applicability to the mulFple crimes commiEed by Israel against PalesFnians, not only in Gaza but in PalesFne as a whole, and argue that R2P is a useful tool to think about the Global Sumud FloFlla. In fact, the Global Sumud FloFlla and like-minded iniFaFves conducted by individuals from all around the world - who self-organize to aEempt to enforce internaFonal norms blatantly violated by states - could be seen as the very embodiment of the Responsibility to Protect. What is R2P? Although there are different versions of R2P, the most authoritaFve one is the one unanimously adopted by UN member states during the World Summit twenty years ago and included in the so-called World Summit Outcome Document. This document entails three paragraphs (138 to 140) on the Responsibility to Protect, which is essenFally a reminder of already exisFng, legally binding obligaFons for states. -From the first, the 2005 Document entails an acknowledgment by UN member states of their responsibility as individual states to protect their populaFons from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This dimension of R2P is commonly referred to as R2P's first pillar. -The 2005 Document also entails a commitment for the internaFonal community to "encourage and help states to exercise this responsiblity". The text states "that the interna4onal community, through the United Na4ons, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diploma4c, humanitarian and other peaceful means in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charte to help to protect popula4ons […]", which is generally refered to as R2P's second pillar. 1

-Finally, should these peaceful means prove "inadequate, and na4onal authori4es are manifestly failing to protect their popula4ons from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity," the 2005 Document specifies that the internaFonal community may "take collec4ve ac4on, in a 4mely and decisive manner." The text indicates that this may be done "through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in coopera4on with relevant interna4onal organiza4ons […]." Furthermore, the Document also "stresses the need for the General Assembly to con4nue considera4on of the responsibility to protect popula4ons [from the four types of exacFons listed] and its implica4ons, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and interna4onal law." R2P's Applicability to Gaza and Pales/ne Although some scholars tried to argue in 2014 that R2P should only be applicable when a state commits atrociFes on its own territory, but not on a foreign territory it controls -thus prevenFng the concept's applicability to atrociFes commiEed by Israel in occupied PalesFnian territories - such an argument contradicts the very purpose of R2P. What characterizes R2P is precisely that it is applicable everywhere, anyFme, for any people subjected to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity when the states/authoriFes in charge prove unable or unwilling to offer protecFon. Based upon the disturbingly clear paEern of well-documented facts and legal analyses available, it can be credibly argued that in Gaza, over the past two years, Israel has been engaged in the commission of all four categories of crimes triggering R2P. Furthermore, R2P being applicable from the moment any of the four crimes is commiEed with the state(s) in charge unable or unwilling to offer protecFon to the populaFon under aEack, it could be safely argued that R2P has been applicable for years prior to the current surge of genocidal violence. A virtual roundtable on "Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and PalesFne" with contribuFons from Ghassan Abu-SiEah, Richard Falk, Siba N'ZaFoula Grovogui, Ilan Pappe and Mazin Qumsiyeh (among others), already concluded in 2019 that R2P was applicable to the mulFfaceted paEern of aEacks that PalesFnians had been facing for decades. R2P's Usefulness While R2P's applicabilty to the situaFon in PalesFne can be clearly established, one of the quesFons that the 2019 roundtable raised - and which may be even more salient from today's perspecFve - is that of R2P's usefulness : what is the point of highlighFng the R2P concept's applicability when clearly binding norms of the highest legal value (peremptory norms of internaFonal law such as the prohibiFon of genocide) are being violated, and disturbingly few of the enforcement mechanisms available in such cases are being used? Does the reference to the Responsibility to Protect add anything? Isn't it in fact a relaFvely fruitless distracFon from much needed legal work under internaFonal criminal law or state responsibility? 2

In my view, there are several reasons to invoke R2P in and of itself, in addiFon to the binding norms upon which it relies: -First, R2P is a tool - at the crossroads of the legal, poliFcal and ethical spheres - that might be used to call for the protecFon of PalesFnians and respect for their rights. Given the deeply unequal and asymetrical nature of PalesFnians' struggle for their basic rights, it would not seem wise to dismiss any potenFally useful tool. -Second, R2P is a tool that is oSen portrayed as a European brainchild. This percepFon is actually misleading, as there is plenty of evidence showing that R2P is to a large extent the outcome of Southern and even more parFcularly African advocacy and norm engineering. However, the widespread percepFon that R2P is a Western tool can serve to increase pressure on former self-proclaimed R2P champions. Twenty years into the endorsement of R2P and two years into the genocidal assault, the far too seldom references to the concept's applicability in PalesFne are missed opportuniFes. -Last but not least, it is essenFal to keep in mind that R2P was born precisely from situaFons of mass atrociFes commiEed by a militarily superior power amidst internaFonal (UN and third states) paralysis or even support for the genocidal power. The Responsibility to Protect is the (modest) outcome of decades of intellectual and diplomaFc efforts to outline how to prevent or react to the gravest crimes targeFng a populaFon that is unable to defend itself on its own. That the R2P norm engineering enterprise did not eradicate the most atrocious and frustraFng situaFons facing humankind should come as no surprise. It surely does not mean that one should give up on such efforts. Global Sumud Flo/lla as the Embodiment of R2P One of the dimensions of R2P that scholars struggled a lot with since the concept was coined is the quesFon of agency. How to acknowledge the Responsibility to Protect as a collecFve responsibility with mulFple potenFal bearers without diffusing the sense of responsibility, making it less likely for anyone to actually do something? The R2P principle as endorsed in 2005 focuses on the state(s) in charge as the primary agent supposed to ensure peoples' protecFon from mass atrociFes. The very essence of R2P, however, lies in the acknowledgement that states may at Fmes lack the willingness or ability to protect the populaFons under their control. In such cases, the responsibility to protect falls on the so-called internaFonal community. The 2005 Wold Summit Outcome Document specifies that this should happen through the United NaFons and provides details on the sequence to be followed : in line with the usual approach, consent-based and peaceful means should always precede the use of coercive measures, which may include, if necessary, the use of military force, authorized by the Security Council in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 3

But what about these all too frequent situaFons when both the state(s) in charge and United NaFons Security Council prove unable or unwilling to guarantee protecFon of a people targeted by genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity? Although the 2005 Document does not explicitly refer to the UniFng for Peace mechanism, its reference to the UN General Assembly "bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and interna4onal law" comes quite close from a formal acknowledgment of this alternaFve path towards protecFve acFon. This, however welcome, does not necessarily ensure efficient protecFon either, as the crimes commiEed by Israel against PalesFnians in Gaza over the past two years unfortunately aEest. Yet history teaches us that even in such cases of state(s) and internaFonal paralysis or complicity in the commission of atrocity crimes, some actors will always try and act, in whatever modest a way. These non-state, oSen even individual, actors are obviously part of the internaFonal - or global - community, not because of their size, but because of the burden they decide to take on. In my previous work, I have therefore argued that acFons undertaken by non-state actors, notably individuals, to react to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity should be acknowledged as embodiments of the R2P principle regardless of their perceived effecFveness. In light of the combined failure of states and of the most prominent UN bodies to ensure protecFon of PalesFnians from a decades-old paEern of internaFonal crimes now culminaFng in full-fledged genocide, the PalesFnian case has offered for long a rich array of what individual or civil society acFons may look like : Freless work of human rights organizaFons, researchers, journalists and acFvists, both from within and outside PalesFne, global solidarity movement, BDS, Gaza Tribunal... The examples of ciFzen-led iniaFves are too numerous and diverse to even be compiled. The Global Sumud FloFlla, however, stands out: it is arguably the most impressive illustraFon to date of individuals taking it upon themselves and self-organizing to mount from scratch a highly complex mariFme operaFon to try and ensure protecFon of a people facing genocide. The parFcipants in the FloFlla have been extremely clear about their primary reason for sailing, in reacFon both to the gravity of the crimes that PalesFnians have been facing in Gaza and to the failure of the actors that are tradiFonnally considered to represent the internaFonal community. As such, their acFon can certainly be seen as embodying the Responsibility to Protect, if not the most fundamental norms of internaFonal law themselves. InterpreFng the Global Sumud FloFlla project as the embodiment of R2P or internaFonal law more broadly is neither a detail nor a scholar's excentric obsession with a concept of dubious usefulness. Acknowledging the FloFlla iniFaFve as the embodiment of R2P and peremptory norms of internaFonal law is of extreme importance and value at a Fme when so many state representaFve have been failing to uphold the most fundamental internaFonal norms, because it reminds us that we, who care and are willing to take on the burden, can be the internaFonal community that we need. 4

The next wave of ships will hopefully achieve the goal to open a humanitarian corridor, which is instrumental to efficiently counter the genocide unfolding in Gaza. And in the meanFme, the iniFaFve is maintaining internaFonal law and the obligaFons to prevent and react to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity alive against all odds. 5